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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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
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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

Confidential

24 MARCH 1971
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 15 - 21 MARCH 1971

Moscow (3439 items)

CPSU 24th Congress	(42%)	39%
Indochina	(11%)	13%
[Solidarity Week	(4%)	7%]
[My Lai Anniversary	(1%)	2%]
Paris Commune Centenary	(2%)	8%
Ulbricht in USSR	(2%)	3%
Indian Elections	(1%)	3%
Middle East	(5%)	3%
China	(5%)	3%
Angela Davis Case	(2%)	2%
Luna 16 & Lunakhod	(2%)	2%

Peking (1504 items)

Domestic Issues	(23%)	45%
[Earth Satellite	(--)	18%]
Launched 3 March		
Indochina	(66%)	29%
[Chou En-lai in DRV	(48%)	18%]
[21st Anniversary	(--)	11%]
of Anti-U.S. Day		
[FUNK 1st Anniversary	(--)	3%]
Paris Commune Centenary	(--)	15%
[Joint Editorial	(--)	12%]
Romanian Government	(--)	3%
Delegation in PRC		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Vietnamese and Laotian communist media continue their jubilant comment on the fighting in southern Laos and northern Quang Tri, with a barrage of superlatives acclaiming insurgent attacks on the withdrawing South Vietnamese forces. Highest praise is given to the 20 March communist assaults in the Ban Dong area which allegedly "annihilated the main core" of the South Vietnamese troops and dealt a "decisive blow which completely frustrates" the allied operation. High-level DRV comment came earlier, at a Mongolian Embassy reception on the 18th, when DRV Defense Minister Giap declared that the insurgents had "scotched" the allies' "mad illusions" about gaining a great victory in Laos.

The concentrated U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam on 21-22 March brought a protest in the form of a DRV Foreign Ministry statement rather than at the lower level of a ministry spokesman's statement. But Hanoi does not express the degree of concern that was registered in the 3 March foreign ministry statement, which charged the United States with planning "new military adventures" against the North and pointedly observed that U.S. actions constitute "an impudent challenge to socialist countries."

Recent Peking expressions of confidence regarding the situation in Indochina have risen to new heights over what is described as a rout of the allied forces in southern Laos. A PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the 23d suggests that "Nixon the gambler" may next resort to bombing North Vietnam, but it predicts that this will not cow the Vietnamese.

Moscow's attention to the "failure" of the Laotian operation is confined to battle reports and routine radio comment. The U.S. air strikes against the North are promptly denounced, with TASS on the 22d noting Soviet intent to continue to give the DRV "all necessary aid." Along with stress on Soviet-DRV solidarity, Moscow continues its jibes at the Chinese in routine broadcasts in Mandarin. In acknowledging Peking's joint editorial marking the centenary of the Paris commune, Soviet media say that the Western press "met with approval" the new Peking attack on the USSR and the international communist movement, particularly since it came at a time of mounting U.S. aggressive actions in Indochina.

COMMUNISTS ACCLAIM ATTACKS ON ARVN WITHDRAWING FROM LAOS

Jubilant communist victory claims pervade the propaganda following the 20 March battle around Ban Dong and the South Vietnamese withdrawal from the major base of Aloui there. Battle reports following

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action on the 20th claimed that the insurgents were attacking remaining South Vietnamese positions and that the Saigon troops were attempting to flee but were trapped and ambushed and could only survive through surrender. An appeal to Saigon troops to defect, issued by the "liberation" army command on the Khe Sanh battlefield on 23 March, claims that more than 15,000 South Vietnamese soldiers and officers engaged in Operation Lam Son 719 have been killed or wounded and that "thousands" of others, including high-ranking officers, have been captured or have surrendered.

Communist claims to have destroyed or captured vast quantities of military supplies and vehicles were capped on 23 March by a Pathet Lao news agency report that says "all" tanks, armored cars, and other military vehicles used in the allied operation in Laos have been "put out of action." The report says that 21 and 22 March saw "a hot pursuit of and bloody attack on the remnants" of Saigon armored regiments "fleeing" from Ban Dong and that "what was left of the enemy armor fleet was completely destroyed," with "most of the enemy survivors" killed or wounded. It adds that a "search for the last of the enemy" is taking place in the surrounding jungle.

Allied aircraft losses are tallied in a 20 March VNA report which claims that from 7 February to 18 March the allies lost more than 500 aircraft in the Laos Operation Lam Son 719. Insurgents in South Vietnam are credited with downing or destroying 112 planes on the ground, "most of them helicopters." In Laos, according to VNA, the "liberation" forces downed or destroyed some 400 aircraft, again mainly helicopters.

RIDICULE OF ALLIED CLAIMS Scattered Hanoi and Front comment has ridiculed optimistic statements by U.S. and Saigon government officials on the Laos operation, and Hanoi's initial comment on President Nixon's 22 March interview over ABC television characteristically charges that the President was trying to conceal "heavy U.S.-Saigon defeats" in the operation. Hanoi's reaction comes in a 24 March VNA commentary which says the President tried to "keep the public completely in the dark" about allied losses. VNA maintains that what has actually happened to the allied forces in the operation has been revealed by the world press and by Saigon officers and soldiers taken prisoner or "fleeing in panic."

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Earlier on the 24th, VNA publicized portions of a statement issued the previous day by the spokesman of the DRV delegation in Paris, who also rejected Administration statements on the Laos operation. The statement argued that insurgent "exploits" in opposition to the allied operation in Laos, the strategic situation of allied forces in southern Laos and Khe Sanh, and "admissions of defeat" by allied soldiers in the field constitute "a stinging denial of the boasts of Nixon and Melvin Laird about their imaginary 'tremendous success.'" The spokesman maintained that the allies' "heavy defeat" in Laos had dealt a "serious blow" to the Vietnamization program and to "the Nixon Administration's plan to expand the war of aggression to the whole of Indochina."

**FIRE BASE LOLO,
ARVN 1ST DIVISION** On 18 March, two days after the ARVN withdrawal from Fire Base Lolo near Tchepone, communist media claimed further achievements in their assault on the base--designated Hill 723 by the communists. The Pathet Lao news agency said on the 18th that in fighting on the two preceding days the entire 1st Regiment of the ARVN 1st Division was "wiped out," including three infantry battalions, one artillery battalion, and the regimental headquarters.* One remaining infantry battalion was "badly mauled," according to the report on the 18th, but a report from the same news agency on the 19th claimed that the remnants of this last battalion were pursued into the jungle by "Lao patriots" who persuaded many of them to surrender and "dispatched the rest." A 19 March VNA account of the battle, attributed to QUAN DOI NHAN DAN's war correspondent, claimed that when the remaining 46 troops of this battalion were ambushed they all surrendered.

Communist reports on the fighting at Fire Base Lolo also specify that more than 1,000 troops were killed or wounded and over 100 others captured, and that "hundreds" of others surrendered. Those killed are said to include the regimental commander and deputy commander. The correspondent's report on the 19th also listed alleged South Vietnamese losses when a company from nearby Hill 680--presumably Fire Base Liz--"attempted a sally" but was ambushed. The company, according

* Initial communist reports on the fighting at Lolo on the 16th claimed that one ARVN battalion had been "annihilated" and three others "cut to smithereens." See the 17 March TRENDS, pages 2-3, for a report on the earlier claims.

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to the correspondent, suffered over 60 killed and many others wounded, while "a dozen others . . . downed their arms."

According to VNA, Hanoi editorial comment on the 19th on the overrunning of Fire Base Lolo said that the ARVN 1st Division is now "almost completely beaten, with three of its regiments knocked out or battered."* The alleged dire position of the ARVN 1st Division comes up in other propaganda, including a 19 March Liberation Radio broadcast of an appeal--dated the 17th--from the Tri-Thieu-Hue PLAF Command to forces in Quang Tri and Thua Thien. The appeal claims that the 1st Division, the "core force" in implementing Vietnamization in "the Tri-Thien battlefield," has "collapsed."

BAN DONG FIGHTING,
ARVN BASE ALOUI

Communist "victories" in fighting in
the Ban Dong area from 18 to 20 March
are profusely acclaimed as decisive

blows in the defeat of the allied operation in Laos. Following the ARVN withdrawal from the Aloui base on the 20th, Laotian communist media report that the insurgents have "brought the whole Ban Dong area under their control." Chronicling events leading up to this achievement, the communists state that on the 17th their forces surrounded the area from Ban Dong to the Ka Ki bridge** and that on the 18th the "liberation army," including armored elements, launched a large-scale attack in the area. "After several days of continuous fighting," the reports claim, on the morning of the 20th the attackers "wiped out most" of the ARVN 1st Armored Brigade and "destroyed" the 1st Airborne

* Communist battle reports claimed earlier that in fighting from 24 February to 1 March in an area south of Highway 9 the communist forces "decimated" the 3d Regiment of the ARVN 1st Division, completely wiping out two of its battalions and "mauling" the regiment's headquarters and two companies of the remaining battalion. The 1st Division's 2d Regiment was said to have suffered losses in 12 March fighting near Tchepone at Hill 748--Fire Base Sophia.

** Judging by available communist maps--in the 23 February NHAN DAN and the 22 February issue of the English-language VIETNAM COURIER--Ka Ki bridge is located on Highway 9 about halfway between Ban Dong and the South Vietnamese border.

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Brigade, "seizing complete control of the Ban Dong area." The 1st Armored Brigade is identified as task force unit consisting of the 7th, 14th, and 4th armored detachments; and a report on the fighting in the 22 March QUAN DOI NHAN DAN also notes that "remnants of the 3d Airborne Brigade" were involved in the battle.*

Communist battle reports also claim that some 200 military vehicles, largely tanks and armored cars, were destroyed or captured in the attacks in the Ban Dong area. The 22 March QUAN DOI NHAN DAN report on the battle details some of the alleged losses of vehicles, reporting one instance in which "liberation fighters," jumped from "armored trucks" and destroyed 50 vehicles and captured 20 others. The report in the army paper also suggests that the South Vietnamese troops were ordered to abandon vehicles since Highway 9 had been cut.

The communists' tally of allied losses in the Ban Dong engagement also claims that more than 80 aircraft were downed, a large number of troops taken prisoner, a large quantity of weapons and war equipment seized, and two helicopters "seized intact." Explaining the latter claim, the 22 March QUAN DOI NHAN DAN report on the fighting recounts how a group of "liberation" soldiers "devised a ruse" to lure two helicopters searching for troops to land and captured the aircraft after the pilots "ran for their life."

The Ban Dong "victory" is hailed on the 22d in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorials which both suggest that the battle was deliberately planned by the communist military leaders. NHAN DAN, for example, says that the Laotian forces in Ban Dong, coordinating with the Khe Sanh front, "fully carried out their plan to drive the enemy into a battle position that they had contemplated, fought the big annihilating battle in Ban Dong, and thereby caused the enemy's aggressive operation to head for inevitable total defeat."

* The 3d Airborne Brigade was reported by the communists to have been "completely wiped out" on 25 February in its position on Hill 31--designated by the communists as Hill 456. See the 3 March TRENDS, pages 8 and 9.

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The paper pays tribute to the "talented strategic and tactical leadership exerted by the Laotian People's Liberation Army Supreme Command," thus maintaining the fiction that North Vietnamese troops are not involved. The NHAN DAN editorial concludes:

The U.S. aggressors have lost in their biggest gamble. A total failure in southern Laos will have extremely serious consequences for them All their calculations for the "Vietnamization" of the war and the "Nixon Doctrine" have proved to be a great error.

FIRE BASE BROWN AND HILL 550 Communist comment on the 20 March Ban Dong battle also lauds the reported seizure that day of Hill 660, the base camp of the 2d Regiment of the ARVN 1st Division--designated Fire Base Brown by the allies. In fighting on the 20th the Lao communist forces are said to have "wiped out" 500 ARVN troops at the base and taken 250 prisoners, including "many" field- and company-grade officers. In assaults on Fire Base Brown beginning 17 March, the communists claim to have "almost completely wiped out" the 2d Regiment, killing or wounding more than 1,500 soldiers, shooting down nearly 90 aircraft, mostly helicopters, and capturing 450 firearms as well as other military equipment. Hanoi comment on these alleged feats notes that the 2nd Regiment had previously been "dealt a heavy blow" at Fire Base Sophia and reiterates the claim that the 1st, 2d, and 3d regiments of the ARVN 1st Division are now "annihilated completely or almost completely."

Attacks on marine positions on hills 550 and 515 are also noted in communist battle reports on the 20th, and reports on the 24th claim that Lao "liberation army" tank and infantry units overpowered and occupied the base on Hill 550* on 22 March. The battle on Hill 550 is greeted by editorials in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 24th which credit the communists with "wiping out" Saigon's 147th Marine Brigade and its artillery force on the hill.

* Available communist reports do not otherwise identify Hill 550, but it may be the allied base Delta or Dong Da which Western news reports on the 24th indicate was abandoned.

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QUANG TRI Reports on the fighting along Highway 9 in northern Quang Tri note shellings of allied bases and communist efforts to disrupt the lines of communication leading from the Laos border. A VNA report on the 23d says that the PLAF, "in close coordination with" the liberation forces in southern Laos, "repeatedly intercepted the U.S. and puppet troops withdrawing from this hot battlefield." While the report does not specifically acknowledge the movement of South Vietnamese troops out of Laos, it cites a reported 22 March PLAF ambush, in the Lang Vei area, of a U.S. convoy which had been "sent to back the Saigon puppet troops' pullout."

COMMUNIST FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM TOLD TO PRESS ATTACKS

A call for communist attacks throughout the two northern provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien was made in the 17 March appeal of the Tri-Thien-Hue PLAF command, broadcast by the Front radio on the 19th. The appeal claimed that the "collapse" of the ARVN 1st Division in Laos had caused confusion and a loss of confidence within the "puppet" army and government in the two provinces, where the 1st Division was the core of the Vietnamization program. It added that this situation provided "a favorable opportunity for our armed forces and people to advance in the flush of success to defeat the enemy's pacification program." The appeal went on to call for, among other things, "simultaneous and widespread attacks," the "annihilation" of local government officials and security forces, the "extermination of fleeing enemy main force troops on the southern Laos and Khe Sanh battlefields," and "fierce attacks on enemy rear bases, storage depots, and airfields."

Other Vietnamese communist comment claims that the allied operation along Highway 9 has provided an opportunity for successes throughout South Vietnam. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the 21st, for example, says that with the allied force spread thin because of the Laos operation, "many localities in the South have further accelerated the people's local warfare movement." It claims that "serious blows" have been directed at the allied pacification program and cites alleged achievements in several provinces.

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HIGHLANDS FIGHTING Action in the South Vietnamese highland provinces has received particular attention in recent weeks, with comment focusing most recently on the reported overrunning of Phu Nhon district capital, Darlac Province, on the night of 15-16 March. The communists also claimed to have crushed an allied offensive in Kontum during the period 1-4 March, "annihilating or seriously mauling" three ARVN battalions; the 1st Battalion of the ARVN 42d Regiment was allegedly put out of action in these attacks.

An LPA commentary on the 23d cites these alleged achievements in the highlands and comments that "the liberation armed forces and people in the high plateau know how to take advantage of the enemy's critical situation." The Phu Nhon "victory," LPA says, involved "highly successful coordination" with the insurgents in Khe Sanh and southern Laos and "handed staggering blows to the enemy 'pacification' program."

HANOI PROTESTS DISPATCH OF MORE THAI TROOPS TO NORTHERN LAOS

A DRV Foreign Ministry statement carried by VNA on 21 March condemns the Thai administration for sending additional Thai combat forces to Laos. It charges that the dispatch of units into the Sam Thong-Long Cheng area raises the total number of Thai troops in the region "to more than 10 battalions." The statement says that the dispatch of troops, at a time when the United States and its Saigon "puppets" are conducting large-scale operations in southern Laos, serves U.S. plans to widen aggression and implement the Nixon Doctrine of "making Asians fight Asians." The DRV statement follows an NLHS Central Committee statement, released on the 19th, which registered a similar protest.

A DRV Foreign Ministry statement on 22 March 1970 had protested the dispatch of two additional Thai battalions to Long Cheng, supporting an NLHS Central Committee statement of the previous day.

BOMBARDMENT OF LUANG PRABANG Communist media have otherwise given little attention to the fighting in northern Laos other than routine battle reports. There has been no monitored acknowledgment of the firing of rockets at Luang Prabang airfield on 21 March. On the 22d Vientiane media reported that the Prime Minister's representative,

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Khamphan Panya, received the ambassadors of Britain and the USSR and asked them to notify their governments of the extreme seriousness of the North Vietnamese action so that they can adopt action in accordance with the Geneva agreements. Communist media have not, of course, mentioned these demarches.

DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY SCORES HEAVY U.S. STRIKES AT NORTH

The concentrated 21-22 March U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam prompted a DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the 22d charging that a "large number" of aircraft "bombed and strafed many densely populated areas in Quang Binh and Ha Tinh provinces, committing many crimes against the local people." While there have been continuing protests at the level of the ministry spokesman, this is the first foreign ministry statement on specific air strikes since that of 21 November 1970 on the massive raids at the time of the prisoner-rescue attempt at Son Tay--an action obliquely acknowledged in a foreign ministry statement on 27 November. While a foreign ministry statement on 3 March 1970 came on the heels of U.S. announcements of concentrated air strikes against the North, it did not acknowledge them and instead focused on alleged U.S. plans for "new military adventures" against the DRV.

The current statement echoes those in November and on 3 March in saying that the air strikes violate the U.S. bombing halt and threaten the work of the Paris conference.* But it does not register the same concern that was evidenced in the earlier statements, and it contains no reflection of the 3 March statement's assertion that U.S. actions are "an impudent challenge to the socialist countries." The current statement says that in response to the 10 December DRV party-government appeal, the Vietnamese people, "always upholding vigilance, are resolved to defeat every new military adventure of U.S. imperialism shoulder to shoulder with the fraternal Lao and Khmer peoples and are resolved to persist in and step up the fight."

* The DRV and PRG chief delegates at Paris have not attended the three Paris sessions since the issuance of the 3 March statement. The communists called off the Paris sessions following the November 1970 strikes, as well as after those in May 1970 which coincided with the Cambodian incursion.

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The statement also says the United States is "sustaining heavy setbacks on all battlefields" in Indochina, "especially" in southern Laos,* and that "the war acts once again prove that at each reverse they suffer" the Americans take "another reckless step of war escalation and expansion, creating a dangerous situation in Indochina and seriously jeopardizing peace in Asia and the world." It routinely predicts heavier defeats.

There was some confusion in Hanoi's claims of the number of planes downed in the latest raids. VNA on the 21st in first mentioning new strikes said that two planes were shot down during raids "on populated areas in the western parts" of Quang Binh and Ha Tinh provinces. And Hanoi on the 22d reported the downing of an F-4 over Quang Binh Province that day. Consistent with these claims the foreign ministry on the 22d claimed three planes.

On the 23d Hanoi claimed that U.S. aircraft were sent "to violate the airspace of Quang Binh Province," that day and that a helicopter was "immediately downed on the spot." (The action is an apparent reference to the rescue of two crewmen of an F-4 fighter-bomber who had spent the night in DRV territory after their plane was downed on the 22d. U.S. reports of the downing and rescue effort made no mention of the alleged helicopter downing.) The same Hanoi broadcast said that according "to additional reports" the number of U.S. planes downed over Quang Binh and Ha Tinh on 21 March was six, noting that "we have previously reported that two of these were downed." Hanoi's total, including the helicopter and the F-4, rose to 3,386 as of the 23d.

FOLLOWUP A Hanoi radio commentary on the 22d, congratulating
COMMENT the communist forces on "frontline" victories in Laos and in Quang Tri, pledges continued readiness "in the rear" and goes on to warn the United States about actions against the DRV. Citing the strikes of "many aircraft" on 21 March, it ridicules the U.S. "pretext" of saving the lives

* At the session on 18 March, PRG deputy delegate Nguyen Van Tien concentrated on U.S. "crimes"--a subject discussed briefly by DRV deputy delegate Nguyen Minh Vy, who scored Vietnamization in standard fashion and ridiculed the notion that it would be helped by the Laos operation.

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of U.S. servicemen and warns that all "U.S. military adventures will be crushed." A NHAN DAN article on the 23d, as reviewed by VNA, cites the latest air strikes in saying "experience teaches us that Nixon is not willing to give up his sinister adventurous plans" against the DRV. These commentaries, however, leave it ambiguous whether the "plans" involve more than air strikes. A statement issued by the DRV spokesman in Paris on the 23d, carried by VNA the next day, does not mention the 21-22 March strikes specifically in saying that the United States is continuing its "war acts" against the DRV, "threatening to conduct large-scale attacks and to bring the war of aggression to North Vietnam."

The only current charge that the United States is contemplating "new military adventures" against the North--the phrase that was used repeatedly in the weeks following the initiation of the Laos operation--appears in the VPA High Command's congratulatory message on the 24th to "compatriots" and armed forces of the 4th military zone on their "outstanding feats-of-arms" in downing nine U.S. planes in the past few days.

In the only available comment from the Front on the raids, an LPA commentary of 24 March charges that some "250 aircraft in many sorties"--a figure also used by Moscow--bombed Quang Binh and Ha Tinh provinces. It says these "new crimes" were "once more arrogantly described" by Secretary Laird as acts of "protecting American lives" and "protective reaction" and adds that "these shopworn contentions cannot cover up the U.S. imperialists' brazen acts of encroachment."

FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN CONTINUES PROTESTS; B-52 CLAIMED

Hanoi continues its charges of daily U.S. bombing against Vinh Linh territory in a 20 March DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement. Accusing the United States of "repeatedly bombing and shelling" DRV territory from 16 to 18 March,* the protest claims that U.S. B-52's and jet fighters bombed Huong Lap village "many times" while U.S. artillery from south of the demilitarized zone "lobbed hundreds of shells on Vinh Son and

* Earlier spokesman's protests are noted in the TRENDS of 17 March, pages 14-15, and of 10 March, pages 14-15.

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Huong Lap villages" in the northern part of the DMZ. Routinely, the statement "strongly denounced and sternly condemned the above mentioned war acts" and demanded a permanent end to all U.S. encroachments on DRV sovereignty and security.

B-52 DOWNING Hanoi radio on 20 March belatedly announced the alleged downing of a B-52* over Vinh Linh area on the 17th. The broadcast claimed that the plane was sent "to attack a populated area in Vinh Linh zone." DRV comment--including a Hanoi radio commentary on the 20th and articles in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 21st--says that for years the United States has used the B-52 as a "trump card" and a "new factor to turn the tide" against the Indochinese people. The comment suggests that the alleged downing was "due punishment" for U.S. actions throughout Indochina.

NHAN DAN calls the downing "an appropriate additional blow to the U.S. aggressors' shrewd strategic maneuver, in coordination with the smashing by the combatants on the Khe Sanh and southern Laos fronts of the U.S. puppets' mobile heliborne and APC-borne tactics on hills." It charges that the United States has "committed an extremely savage crime" against the Indochinese people by using B-52's on a large scale in Indochina, and it claims that "for more than one month" Vinh Linh has been bombed almost every day by B-52's. Describing the downing as "a victorious battle long expected by our people," the paper says it represented "a stern warning" by North Vietnam, "which is ready to fight and smash all military adventures" of the United States.

* The last known claim of a downed B-52 was on 11 January 1968, prior to the partial bombing halt. Others claimed were on 21 December, 29 October, and 17 September 1967. See the TRENDS of 29 January 1969 for a review of DRV charges of B-52 actions during 1968.

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PEKING HAILS COMMUNIST SUCCESSES IN SOUTHERN LAOS

The confidence recently evinced by Peking in commenting on the situation in Indochina is capped by two PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator articles in three days, on the 21st and 23d, which claim that victories by the communist forces in southern Laos have proven the bankruptcy of Vietnamization and have placed the United States in "an inextricable dilemma" in Indochina at present. The article on the 23d, entitled "Let Us See How the Nixon Administration Makes the Next Move," suggests that "Nixon the gambler" may resort to bombing of North Vietnam but it asserts that this will not cow the communists and that the United States will "certainly be severely punished" for any encroachments on the DRV. None of the current comment portrays a serious threat to the DRV's security, and there is no mention of Chinese security interests.

The Commentator article on the 21st interprets communist successes in southern Laos over crack ARVN units backed by strong air and artillery power as demonstrating the efficacy of people's war in the face of superior arms. Explaining what may be a central element in Peking's current confidence, Commentator says the fighting in southern Laos proves that modern warfare still depends on the human factors and on "close-quarter fighting and night operation." The article claims that the allied troops "have been utterly routed and are retreating pell-mell."

The article on the 23d, arguing that the operation in southern Laos has been a debacle for the Nixon Administration not only militarily but also in "its political gambling," comes close to spelling out the allied aim of cutting off the communist supply routes. Commentator observes that the allies hoped to occupy southern Laos and to "cut off the close ties among the peoples of the three Indochinese countries." Instead, according to Commentator, the "rosy promises" made by the President "to hoax public opinion" have "vanished like a bubble." In noting that this leaves the United States in a dilemma, the article says "Nixon the gambler thinks that there are still some cards left in his hand," but it mentions only increased bombing of North Vietnam as "one of the clumsy tricks" the President may choose.

It is indicative that the two recent Commentator articles are addressed in confident terms to the tide of battle in southern Laos. Commentator articles last month reflected a more wary mood, showing concern over U.S. intentions and sharply challenging the President's denial that allied operations pose a threat to China. Neither the two recent Commentator articles nor other current

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Chinese comment raises the issue of China's security, and Peking has seen no need to repeat its pledge--last reiterated in the 11 March PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on Chou En-lai's visit to Hanoi--to support the Vietnamese even to the extent of the greatest national sacrifices.

VIETNAM ANTI-U.S. RALLY Chou's visit was recalled as an event of "far-reaching significance" in a speech on 19 March by Politburo member Chiu Hui-tso, one of the two high-ranking military leaders who accompanied Chou. Speaking at a Peking rally marking the 21st anniversary of the "Day of All-Vietnam Struggle Against U.S. Aggression,"* Chiu described the situation in Indochina as "getting better and better." After hailing the Chou visit as strengthening Sino-Vietnamese unity, Chiu cited the instruction of Mao about support for the Vietnamese that had been introduced by Chou in Hanoi and repeated in the 11 March editorial. His remarks did not, however, throw any additional light on the target of Mao's warning against betraying the Vietnamese.

Consistent with other current comment, Chiu avoided any mention of China's security interests or of a possible need for national sacrifices in calling on the Chinese, including the PLA, to fulfill their internationalist duty of supporting their Indo-chinese allies.

ANNIVERSARY OF SIHANOUK'S FRONT OBSERVED BY PEKING, HANOI

The first anniversary of Sihanouk's 19 March arrival in Peking and the founding of his FRONT on 23 March is marked in the Chinese capital with a banquet addressed by Chou En-lai and Sihanouk, a greetings message from the Chinese leaders, and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial. In his banquet speech, on the 19th, Chou once again expresses confidence over the situation in Indochina, saying that U.S. imperialism "miscalculated" when it overthrew Sihanouk

* Hanoi marked the anniversary with radio comment and press editorials notable for their attention to communist "victories" in the Laos operation. There is no reference to the usual commemorative meeting. Front propaganda includes an LPA interview with NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho, as well as his letters to the "world's people" and to "compatriots and combatants" in Saigon and other South Vietnamese cities.

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and tried to turn Cambodia into its colony and military base for expanding the war in Indochina. The Americans had not expected, says Chou, that this would kindle the flames of the "Cambodian people's war" and bring about "a completely new situation in the three Indochinese people's unity against U.S. imperialism." He reviews the patriots' military successes in Cambodia and Laos and reiterates that the U.S. aggression "turned the whole of Indochina into a single battlefield." The situation in the Indochinese war, he says, "has never been so favorable as it is today." Chou falls back on standard formulations when he says that China is the "rear area of Cambodia and other Indochinese peoples," and asserts that in response to Mao's 20 May statement on Cambodia the Chinese people "resolutely support" the Cambodian people in their war against U.S. aggression.

Chou does not mention aid, but Sihanouk, in typically exuberant language, thanks the PRC for its "very powerful backing, unreserved support, and immeasurable and unparalleled aid." Furthermore, while Peking has not repeated the pledge, Sihanouk recalls that while in Hanoi, Chou En-lai had warned that the Chinese will "take all necessary measures, not flinching even from the greatest national sacrifices, to give all-out support and assistance to the Vietnamese people's war."

The congratulatory message from Tung Pi-wu, vice chairman of the PRC, and Chou En-lai to Sihanouk and Penn Nouth reiterates that China will "unswervingly fulfill the bounden internationalist duty of the great rear area to the great front and resolutely support the Cambodian people and all the three peoples of Indochina." The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial also praises the "excellency" of the Indochinese situation, lauding the "rapid development and brilliant victories" of the Cambodian people, and hails the "militant unity" of the three Indochinese peoples forged at the Indochinese peoples summit conference. It again reiterates that China is the "great rear area" for the Cambodian and other Indochinese people, and adds that "it is our unshirkable internationalist duty to do everything in our power to support and aid the Cambodian and other Indochinese peoples."

Peking propaganda habitually does not go beyond promising "support" or "powerful backing" to the Cambodians. It mentions "support and assistance" only when referring to the Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian peoples as a whole. Sihanouk has, however, periodically thanked the Chinese for their "aid."

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HANOI AND DRV President Ton Duc Thang and PRG leaders Nguyen
THE FRONT Huu Tho and Huynh Tan Phat sent Sihanouk greetings
messages on the anniversary which praise the vic-
tories of the Cambodian patriots and laud the fighting unity of
the three Indochinese peoples developed in accordance with the
declaration of the Indochinese peoples summit conference. A
NHAN DAN editorial on the anniversary echoes these sentiments,
adding that it is because of his defeats in Cambodia and the
failure of Vietnamization in South Vietnam that President Nixon
has embarked on the invasion of Laos. It expresses gratitude
to the Cambodian people who are helping foil Vietnamization and
the Nixon Doctrine of "making Asians fight Asians."

MOSCOW SCORES BOMBING OF DRV, CLAIMS LAOS OPERATION "FAILED"

Moscow has promptly denounced the 21-22 March bombing raids
against North Vietnam with routine-level comment which recalls
the promise in the 25 February Soviet Government statement that
the USSR will give the DRV "all necessary aid." TASS commenta-
tor Orlov remarked on the 22d that "the American militarists
apparently have a short memory," having forgotten that their
former attempt to break the will of the DRV by an extensive air
war "ended in utter failure." Orlov said the latest raids con-
firm that the Americans are not showing any readiness for a
"serious and constructive discussion at the Paris talks."

An English-language radio commentary of 23 March, denouncing
the bombing, observes that in his TV interview on the 22d
President Nixon "made it clear that the air raids will continue,"
referring to the need to protect the lives of American soldiers.
The commentator says people will no longer be "taken in" by this
argument, which was also used to justify the invasions of
Cambodia and Laos. Nevertheless, he adds, President Nixon in
his interview refused to set a deadline for troop withdrawal,
"threatened" to use U.S. air power in any part of Southeast Asia,
and "let it be understood" that the Administration "neither wishes
to, nor is prepared to, discuss a political settlement in sub-
stance at the talks in Paris."

A TASS commentary of the same date on the President's interview
includes similar complaints and says the President indicated
that the United States is not going to change its present aggres-
sive course in Southeast Asia. His statement, says the commenta-
tor, "again contained threats against the DRV and the Vietnamese
people."

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The 23d March commentary in English says that "with each new setback in Indochina the American forces of invasion become more rash," and the bombings of the DRV show the "fury of the U.S. Command" over the "fiascos" in Laos and other parts of the region. The 23 March TASS commentary says the President "admitted" that there has been "considerable discussion" of the results of the Laos operation but asserted that its success or failure remains to be seen. The commentary notes that he said that the Saigon troops had suffered serious losses in Laos and that there will be more serious fighting as they continue to withdraw.

Moscow's limited, routine-level comment on the "failure" of the Laotian operation includes a foreign-language radio talk on 22 March by Soltan, who says the operation was designed to "test" the Vietnamization program and observes that even the U.S. press has described the "defeat" of the Saigon forces in Laos as a "disaster." On the 22d TASS reviewed the first press report from the field by PRAVDA reporter Shchedrov; he describes the battles in a report from "Savannaket and Vientiane" but offers no comment, to judge from the available summary. Shchedrov had been PRAVDA's correspondent in Hanoi in the mid-1960's, during which time he visited Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam.

MOSCOW MARKS VIETNAM SOLIDARITY WEEK WITH STRESS ON AID

A 16-23 March week of solidarity with Vietnam--which included observance of the 21st anniversary of the Vietnam anti-U.S. struggle day--was marked in Moscow with meetings and rallies throughout the country, press and radio comment, and messages from public organizations. The propaganda stresses that the Soviets will continue to fulfill their "international duty" of giving the Vietnamese aid and support, and in this context IZVESTIYA and PRAVDA articles on the 17th and 18th cite the 25 February Soviet Government statement's promise of "all necessary aid." The PRAVDA article also recalls that the statement pointed to the DRV's membership in the "socialist family." PRAVDA recalls that the December 1970 statement by the Warsaw Pact member states also promised continued support to the peoples of Indochina.

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Some Mandarin-language propaganda on the solidarity week has polemical overtones, but it generally refrains from direct attacks on Peking policies. A broadcast in Mandarin on 21 March reported that the DRV ambassador to the PRC, at a press conference in Peking in connection with the anti-U.S. day, answered a question on Soviet aid by pointing out "emphatically" that the USSR has provided the DRV with "full support" and "great assistance" and recalling that the Soviet Government statement denounced U.S. escalation of aggression. Peking's report of this press conference does not, of course, include this exchange.

Several commentaries in Mandarin in connection with the solidarity week emphasize Soviet aid to Vietnam, recalling various official pronouncements on the subject including the Soviet leaders' message on the 2 September 25th anniversary of the DRV, Brezhnev's 12 June 1970 election speech, and the document of the June 1969 international conference of communist and workers' parties. The commentaries also cite expressions of Vietnamese gratitude for Soviet aid, with some recalling Pham Van Dong's interview publicized in Soviet media from 10 to 12 March.

A specific attack on Peking's policies appears in a 20 March Radio Peace and Progress commentary in Mandarin. Pointing out that the Soviet people are pledging continued aid in solidarity rallies and recalling the Soviet Government statement's promise of aid, the commentary charges that Chinese propaganda tries to conceal the facts of Soviet aid to Vietnam. It recalls that at a rally during Chou En-lai's visit to the DRV Pham Van Dong pointed out "the important significance of the invaluable assistance and support from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to Vietnam." The only other explicit attack on Peking in solidarity week propaganda comes in a 19 March commentary in Mandarin which says the present Chinese leaders have "betrayed the common stand of the countries of the great socialist family and all anti-imperialist forces," trying to fan "anti-Soviet hysteria" and implementing a "splittist policy." It cites as an example the 18 March Peking joint editorial on the Paris Commune centenary.

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Attacks on Peking's Indochina stand appear in some comment pegged to the Paris Commune centenary. A 19 March Radio Peace and Progress commentary in Mandarin, scoring the Peking joint editorial, also refers to Pham Van Dong's praise of Soviet aid at the rally for Chou En-lai.* Other comment on the Paris Commune anniversary includes brief passing assertions that anticommunists are pleased that the Chinese attacks come at a time when U.S. aggression is mounting in Indochina. A commentary broadcast in Mandarin on the 18th notes in this context that the Americans have expanded the war to "China's very door" and says Peking has stated that "this matter is of only secondary importance," the "main target" being the USSR.

SERIES IN VIETNAMFSE A series of commentaries broadcast in
REVIEWS SOVIET AID Vietnamese from 17 to 21 March, pegged
to the forthcoming CPSU congress,
reviews Soviet aid to Vietnam since the inception of the bombing in 1965 and stresses the solidarity of the two countries over the years. Declaring that economic and military aid from the USSR and other socialist countries helped the DRV withstand U.S. bombing, the commentaries say the USSR also called upon world governments through "diplomatic channels" to urge the United States to end the aggression.

Soviet assistance, say the commentaries, helped "compel" the United States to stop the bombing and go to the negotiating table in Paris. They go on to express support for the DRV and NFLSV programs for a political settlement. Recapping the series of aid agreements the USSR has signed with the DRV, they review various statements made by Soviet leaders over the years on aid and support as well as DRV expressions of gratitude. Pointing to exchanges of visits, the commentaries recall that Kosygin went to Hanoi for Ho's funeral in September 1969, that Pham Van Dong and Nguyen Huu Tho visited the USSR later that fall, and that Le Duan came for the Lenin centenary in April 1970.

* Prior to the two commentaries in Mandarin, Moscow had mentioned Chou's visit only in a one-sentence TASS report on 9 March.

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There are no explicit criticisms of Peking policies in these commentaries, but there are a few passing references to socialist unity. One commentary recalls that the statement for the June 1969 international conference of communist and workers' parties expressed resolve to coordinate actions in the struggle against the "common enemy." Another recalls that the Soviet greetings message on the VWP's 40th anniversary said that the friendly relations between the CPSU and the VWP contribute to the "strengthening of unity and solidarity among the socialist community as well as in the international communist and workers' movement."

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

PEKING REAFFIRMS IDEOLOGICAL RIVALRY; CHOU SEES TOLSTIKOV

Less than two weeks before the opening of the CPSU's 24th congress, Peking used the occasion of the centenary of the Paris Commune to issue another major ideological statement challenging Moscow's leadership of the communist movement. As in the previous case of the Lenin centenary last April, Peking's challenge took the form of an authoritative joint editorial article published on 17 March by PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG, and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY. Like the article last April, the current one seems designed as another reaffirmation of Peking's ideological line in pursuing the "irreconcilable" struggle that the Chinese promised when they agreed to enter negotiations with the Soviets in October 1969. As such, it reflects changes that have taken place in the past year but does not appear to signal any new departure in Sino-Soviet relations.

Moscow's reaction has been in a low key, consisting of a TASS report on the 21st, published in PRAVDA the next day, and a predictable stream of comment broadcast to the Chinese defending Soviet policy and charging Peking with violating the principles of the Paris Commune. TASS reported that the Chinese article expounds "the known concept of Maoism," distorts Marxist-Leninist doctrine, and "is full of rude attacks and slander" against Moscow and the "general course" of the international communist movement. TASS noted pointedly that anticommunists were especially delighted by Peking's new attack because it coincided with "mounting aggressive actions by American imperialism in Indochina." Moscow's broadcasts to the Chinese have elaborated on this theme, charging that the enemy takes account of Peking's anti-Soviet position when planning operations in Indochina.

On 21 March, four days after Peking's ideological blast, Chou En-lai had a talk with Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov and Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev, head of the Soviet delegation to the Sino-Soviet talks. Moscow reported the meeting on 23 March; Peking has not yet mentioned it. According to Moscow's report, other Chinese present included Chi Peng-fei, identified for the first time by Moscow as acting foreign

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minister, and Chiao Kuan-hua, head of the PRC delegation at the Peking talks and deputy foreign minister in charge of Soviet affairs. Moscow's report said "questions of interest to both sides" were discussed, with no indication of the atmosphere or specific topics.

According to an AFP dispatch from Peking on the 23d quoting "informed sources," the conversation lasted for about four hours until 0300 the next morning after it had been arranged at a banquet for a visiting Nepalese delegation on the evening of the 21st. AFP's account says the talk took place about a month after Tolstikov had unsuccessfully sought an audience with Chou. The Soviet ambassador did meet at that time with Chi Peng-fei, to whom he delivered the text of the 25 February Soviet Government statement on Laos, the account says, adding that Peking carried a report on the statement the next day. (NCNA's report on the statement was carried on 27 February.)

Chinese suspicions regarding Moscow's intentions were expressed in a 20 March NCNA report that the Soviets had invited a Japanese military mission for a visit next month. In a rare reference to Soviet troops stationed opposite the PRC border, NCNA cited Japanese press reports to the effect that the Japanese mission would be permitted to visit "the Soviet units garrisoned along the Sino-Soviet border" as well as the Vladivostok naval base and the Baykonur space center. NCNA also noted that the invitation was made at a time when the United States "is frenziedly expanding its aggressive war in Indochina and Japanese militarism is doing its utmost to serve U.S. imperialist aggression." After citing a Japanese press agency as saying the visit will mark the beginning of new developments in defense and foreign policy between Japan and the Soviet Union, NCNA quoted a paper as noting that in taking this step Moscow "might have taken the factor of China into consideration."

PRC ARTICLE EXPOUNDS MAOIST LINE ON COMMUNIST STRATEGY

Peking's joint editorial article on the Paris Commune centenary singles out the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the focus of struggle within the communist movement in the past hundred years and as the crucial issue in the Sino-Soviet ideological conflict. The article expounds a fundamentalist

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line stressing the role of violence in seizing and maintaining power while charging Moscow with having betrayed the revolutionary principles of the Paris Commune. But in doing so the article seeks to strike some balance between hardline Maoist orthodoxy and the needs of current policy, and it notably mutes Sino-Soviet tensions while denouncing Moscow as the seat of modern revisionism.

SOVIET Echoing the polarizing polemics of the 1960's,
BETRAYAL the article assails "modern revisionism with
 the Soviet revisionist renegade clique as its
center" for having "completely betrayed Marxism" on the
"fundamental question" of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
In a replay of a basic issue in the dispute over communist
strategy, the article flatly asserts that violent revolution
is the universal principle of proletarian revolution, to
which there is no exception. The article's indictment
of the Soviet leadership, punctuated by repeated jabs at
Brezhnev personally, accuses Moscow of adhering to the
heretical doctrine of "the state of the whole people"--
an issue with which the post-Khrushchev leadership has
wrestled with evident unease--and of opposing revolutionary
violence while oppressing people at home and abroad.

Though renewing charges that Moscow is pursuing militarism
and has stationed troops in East Europe and the Mongolian
People's Republic, the article reflects Peking's interest
in keeping Sino-Soviet tensions at a low level by skirting
the border conflict. In contrast, the article on the Lenin
centenary last April mentioned the border clashes and
charged that the Soviets had engaged in nuclear threats
and wished to occupy more Chinese territory. The current
article also fails to cite two quotations of Mao evoking
a threat of war which had been mentioned in last April's
article.

The article on the Paris Commune picks up a theme used in
Peking's attack on Moscow at the time of the Polish
disturbance last December, noting that Czechoslovakia's
Novotny and Poland's Gomulka have followed Khrushchev into
the refuse of history. But in warning vaguely that whoever
betrays the dictatorship of the proletariat "will come to
no good end," the article falls well short of the inflammatory
prediction of Chinese propaganda in the past that the present
Kremlin leadership will be toppled by the Soviet people.

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COMMUNIST STRATEGY The current article has a broader scope than the one on the Lenin centenary, which focused mainly on Moscow's policies as betraying the Leninist heritage. Using the centenary of the armed uprising that created the Paris Commune as the occasion for lecturing the communist movement on correct strategy, the article comes down hard on fundamentalist tenets regarding armed struggle and insists on the need for a protracted ideological challenge to Soviet-style revisionism. While citing the Albanian, Vietnamese, and Korean revolutions along with the Russian and Chinese revolutions as illustrating the role of armed struggle in the seizure of power, the article characteristically mentions only the Albanian party together with the CCP as representing the "genuine Marxist-Leninists" struggling against Soviet revisionism.

The article reaffirms the Maoist hard line excluding the parliamentary road to power, an issue Peking has avoided of late while seeking to cultivate relations with a variety of governments, particularly in Latin America. But by having recourse to the distinction between the national democratic revolution and the socialist revolution, which "represent two different stages and are different in character," the article provides a rationale for Peking's favorable treatment of a government like Allende's in Chile, in which a Moscow-lining communist party is a participant. Recent Chinese propaganda on Latin America has conveniently ignored the question of revolutionary strategy in favor of a stress on nationalist trends in the area. Thus the 7 January PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the establishment of PRC-Chilean diplomatic relations warmly praised Allende's policies as promoting "national and democratic movements" in Latin America.

In one notable sign of flexibility in this fundamentalist discourse on strategy, the joint editorial article seeks to avoid creating an impression of Maoist evangelism in the communist movement and eschews the formulation used in last April's article that "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought" is the guiding doctrine of the world revolutionary movement. The article does sound a theme with overtones of Sino-Soviet competition in the communist movement, claiming that the situation today "urgently" demands strong leadership by "genuine Marxist-Leninist parties" and the building of parties which "completely break with the revisionist line."

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But in elaborating this view it asserts that each party should implement a line suited to the conditions of its own country and should avoid mechanically copying foreign experience.

It is noteworthy in this context that the article cites an "important inscription" written by Mao for Japanese workers saying the Japanese revolution will be successful "provided the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism is really integrated with the concrete practice of the Japanese revolution." This inscription was first publicized on its sixth anniversary, 18 September 1968, at a time when Peking showed signs of muting the strident Maoist universalism that had accompanied Chinese isolation--as a kind of whistling in the dark--during the cultural revolution.

ROLE OF MAO'S THOUGHT While tempering the universalist claims in behalf of Maoism, the article makes a case for Mao's original contribution to communist doctrine on what it terms "the most important question of our time--the question of consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat and preventing the restoration of capitalism." In advancing the doctrine underlying the cultural revolution as the answer to this question, the article claims, Mao "inherited, defended, and developed" the Marxist-Leninist theory of proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat and made "a great new contribution to Marxism-Leninism." But such a claim stops short of that made at the height of the cultural revolution, when Mao was acclaimed as the supreme Marxist-Leninist mentor who has carried Marxism-Leninism to its "highest in the present era."

The article notes with pride that the cultural revolution "exploded the imperialists' and modern revisionists' fond dream of restoring capitalism in China" as happened in the Soviet Union. It warns the communist movement to guard not only against external enemies but also against "such careerists and schemers as Khrushchev and Brezhnev who usurped party and state leadership from within." The warning appears at a time when a wide array of communist leaders is about to gather around Brezhnev at the CPSU congress.

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MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW BELABORS ISRAEL, UNITED STATES ON WITHDRAWAL ISSUE

Soviet propaganda continues to focus on Israel's refusal to return to the 4 June 1967 borders, at the same time singling out Secretary Rogers' statement at his 16 March press conference that the United States has never said Israel has to withdraw from all territory. Calling this a "key phrase" which predetermined the outcome of Israeli Foreign Minister Eban's talks in the United States, a foreign-language commentary by Tsoppi on the 23d says Eban received assurances from Rogers that the United States would not impose any decisions on Tel Aviv. And other comment, dismissing any idea of "so-called disagreement" between Washington and Tel Aviv, stresses that Eban has maintained that there is no question of U.S. pressure on Israel.

Moscow notes that Tel Aviv is again pressing for direct Arab-Israeli negotiations, citing Eban as saying that the character of the Jarring contacts "does not suit" his government. Commentators repeat the standard Soviet line that there can be no direct talks as long as Israel retains the occupied territories. Despite U.S. financing of the "supermilitarization" of Israel and the latter's obstruction--with "U.S. blessing"--of Jarring's mission, the Arab leaders, according to commentator Tsoppi, with "heroism and bravery" insist on a political solution.

There are passing references to the issue of international guarantees and an international peacekeeping force, Moscow only indirectly suggesting support by indicating Egyptian acceptance and Israeli objections. The United States is accused, for the third time in the past few weeks, of obstructing efforts in the Big Four talks to arrive at a coordinated statement of support for the Jarring mission. IZVESTIYA's New York correspondent Sturua, as reported by TASS on the 18th, complained that in the four-power consultations the Americans have been trying "to reduce everything to the question of prolonging the cease-fire." He concluded that no one any longer believes recent U.S. statements to the effect that the United States "allegedly exerts influence on Israel."

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TASS SELECTIVE/ Y REPORTS AS-SADAT FRENCH TELEVISION INTERVIEW

Reporting President as-Sadat's French television interview, recorded on the 16th and released on the 23d, TASS highlights his statement that full Israeli withdrawal and recognition of Palestinian rights constitute the basis for a settlement, and points up his affirmation of his 4 February proposal on reopening the Suez Canal if Israel partially withdraws from the Sinai peninsula.

TASS also notes as-Sadat's rejection of Israel's demand for unilateral demilitarization of the Sinai peninsula, and his readiness to agree to the presence of a UN international peacekeeping force, "including a contingent of the four great powers," as a guarantee of secure borders. The account reports his stipulation that the forces must be stationed on both sides of the Egyptian-Israeli border. While Moscow has generally evaded the issue of international guarantees and an international peacekeeping force, a Glazunov foreign-language commentary on the 21st asked if Tel Aviv thinks that borders "set up as a result of armed gangsterism" are less dangerous and more reliable than borders "recognized by their neighbors and internationally guaranteed." And a TASS account on the 20th of Eban's Washington press conference the previous day, like Glazunov equating the idea of secure and recognized frontiers with "annexationist plans," noted that Eban "actually rejected the idea of stationing a UN peacekeeping force on Israel's frontiers."

Reporting as-Sadat's interview, TASS does not mention his remarks, in reply to a question on his 1-2 March talks in Moscow, that the Soviets "told us it was better under the present circumstances to talk together," and that "I was personally thinking of the same thing even before I received their message to come to Moscow." Nor does TASS refer to his rejection of U.S. and Israeli "propaganda on Soviet influence, Soviet pressure, and Soviet presence in the area."

MOSCOW DEFENDS SOVIET-ARAB RELATIONS, AMBIGUOUS ON U.S. ROLE

Moscow does evince some sensitivity to "imperialist propaganda" on the Soviet presence and intentions in the Middle East and the USSR's relations with the Arabs. For example, a broadcast for Arab listeners on the 23d complains that "imperialist and Zionist propaganda" is again "scaring the Arabs about the

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so-called Soviet danger," and finds it surprising that some of the "fabrications" about the "so-called Soviet iron fist" should find their way to "some of the Arab press."

While defensive about the Soviet relationship with the Arabs, Moscow is ambiguous in its attitude toward the U.S. role in the Middle East. On the one hand, propaganda maintains that the United States has the ability but not the desire to exert pressure on Israel; on the other, Moscow seems to be seeking to counter any ideas among the Arabs that U.S. diplomacy has a key role to play in a settlement, or that there has been any change in Washington's attitude toward the Arabs. Thus TASS and PRAVDA pick up comment in Cairo's AL-JUMHURIYAH defending Soviet-Arab relations against "imperialist fabrications" and rebutting "Western propaganda" efforts to portray a new U.S. course vis-a-vis the Arabs and to "exaggerate" the role of American diplomacy in a settlement.

It is unclear why Moscow, by playing up several AL-JUMHURIYAH articles along these lines, is in effect involving itself in that paper's controversy with AL-AHRAM chief editor Haykal--a dispute Moscow does not openly acknowledge. The Lebanese communist press, however, forthrightly takes AL-JUMHURIYAH's side in challenging Haykal, the party weekly AL-AKHBAR attacking him on the 14th for asserting that the United States is not the Arabs' enemy.

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GERMANY AND BERLIN

WEST BERLIN ELECTION OUTCOME BLAMED ON "ANTIDEMOCRATIC" SYSTEM

In very limited comment on the results of the 14 March elections in West Berlin, Soviet and GDR media have sought to rationalize the failure of the Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin (SEW) to gain representation in the West Berlin House of Representatives, blaming the election system and a "campaign of anticommunist slander" by rightwing forces while noting that the SEW registered a gain over its vote in the 1967 elections.

Initial TASS reports of the election outcome criticized the city's "undemocratic election system" under which a party must receive a minimum of five percent of the votes to be represented in the city's parliament. Summarizing the results of the voting, TASS' West Berlin correspondent Bashmachnikov noted on the 15th that although the SEW had received some 4,000 votes more than the 30,000 it gained in 1967, or 2.3 percent of the vote compared with 2.0 percent four years ago, it will not be represented in the House because of the "antidemocratic election law."

Noting that the CDU had made gains at the polls at the expense of the SPD, PRAVDA's West Berlin correspondents Voronov and Khodakovskiy concluded that the election results "prove the activization of extreme reaction" in West Berlin. CDU/CSU leaders Strauss, Kiesinger, Barzel, and others "who illegally participated in the city campaign," the dispatch said, "stopped at nothing in denigrating the treaty between the USSR and the FRG and the constructive proposals of the USSR and the GDR for the settlement of the West Berlin problem, and in terrifying the inhabitants with a mythical 'threat from the East.'" The PRAVDA dispatch, published on the 16th, stated that despite "a campaign of anticommunism and slander by the rightist forces," the SEW had strengthened its position by gaining up to three percent in a number of districts and that the party was meeting with "growing understanding" among the West Berlin working people.

GDR PUBLICITY FOR
SEW ASSESSMENT

GDR media reported the election results, picked up some TASS items rationalizing the showing made by the SEW, and publicized a post mortem issued by the SEW bureau which concluded that the elections had not solved "a single urgent problem" of importance to West Berliners. In an apparent allusion to the negotiations

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between West Berlin Senat Director Ulrich Mueller and GDR First Deputy Foreign Minister Guenter Kohrt, which began on the 6th and had their second session two days before the election, the statement said it was the SEW "initiative aimed at normalizing relations between West Berlin and the GDR" that remained "the order of the day."

The SEW's election campaign had been buttressed by the GDR's ploy to promote direct negotiations with the Senat, and East German media had publicized the role of SEW Chairman Danelius in developing the GDR initiative. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND quoted Danelius as stating at an election meeting on the 3d that the SEW had "decisively influenced the formulation of the generous GDR offer to the Senat and to the West Berliners," which included the enticement of an agreement to allow West Berliners to visit East Berlin and the GDR over the Easter holidays.

Neither GDR nor Soviet media publicized a post-election statement attributed to Danelius by DPA to the effect that the CDU gains in the election would impede the process of accommodation between West Berlin and the GDR. The Warsaw Catholic paper SLOWO POWSZECHNE, however, reported on the 16th that Danelius, "who often reflects the moods in the GDR capital, gave a warning that the success of the CDU will greatly hinder normalization between West Berlin and the GDR." Commenting that the vote for the CDU was "an expression of dissatisfaction with the rule of the mayor and the Senat and, indirectly, with the too small assistance--in the view of West Berliners--provided by Bonn," the Polish daily concluded that the election results "hinder both the Berlin negotiations and Brandt's Eastern policy as a whole."

Nor did East German or Soviet media pick up an interview granted DER SPIEGEL by Danelius, published in the West German weekly on 22 March, in which the SEW leader denied that he had been "angry" when he made the statement about the impact of the CDU vote. Danelius went on to explain what he had meant. With increased representation, DER SPIEGEL quoted him as stating, the West Berlin CDU would now "attempt to increase its efforts" against the Soviet and Polish treaties with West Germany and against "the normalization of relations between West Berlin and the GDR." Danelius denied that the SEW had engaged in an "election maneuver" in trying to set itself up as a "mediator" between the East German Government and the West Berlin Senat at talks prior to the elections with GDR Premier Stoph and Soviet Ambassador to the GDR Abrasimov.

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GDR PUBLICLY DENIES BONN ACCOUNTS OF BAHR-KOHL MEETINGS

Following the ninth meeting in the current series of GDR-FRG talks between State Secretaries Kohl and Bahr in Bonn on 17 March, and against the background of increased public discussion of Brandt's Ostpolitik in West Germany, GDR media have carried a spate of items--including the text of a GDR Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the 19th--outlining the East German position on the Bahr-Kohl meetings. The talks had been the subject of minimal discussion in East Berlin media until now. On the 19th ADN reported that the official statement had been made by a "GDR Government spokesman" in response to "distortions of the current talks" between Kohl and Bahr; NEUES DEUTSCHLAND the next day attributed the statement to a spokesman of the GDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. TASS carried the ADN text of the statement.

Asserting that reports have appeared in the FRG which "grossly distort the content of the talks" by representing them as "an 'intra-German' dialog . . . between the GDR and the FRG," the statement charges that an attempt is being made "to prevent third countries from normalizing their relations with the GDR in order not 'to disturb' this dialog." Declaring that in fact the GDR and the FRG representatives are discussing, "in accordance with their sovereign competences, questions of traffic which are of mutual interest," the statement concludes that reports of this kind "might impair the further exchange of views between the two sides." On the evening of the 19th an East Berlin radio commentary broadcast to Europe charged directly that Bonn is "misusing" the talks and is trying to bring the GDR under its "tutelage."

SED Politburo member Honecker also publicly broached the subject of the Bahr-Kohl meetings in a speech on the 20th in Halle commemorating the 1921 revolutionary struggles in Germany. Noting that the FRG Government and the West German press had recently spoken "increasingly of progress" in the Bahr-Kohl meetings, Honecker said, according to ADN, that "in actual fact these are talks between representatives of two independent states to facilitate successful progress in the four-power negotiations on West Berlin, as the GDR Government proposed to the FRG Government in October 1970."

Repeating the charge central to the official statement, Honecker said that Bonn, with its "talk about an 'intra-German dialog'

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on which one must wait to see the outcome," wants to prevent third countries from normalizing relations with the GDR--an act which he described as "hostile" to detente and as a "gross interference not only in the internal affairs of the GDR" but also in the affairs of third countries. Bonn would like to make the third countries believe that the GDR "is ready to submit to Bonn's tutelage by way of 'intra-German special relations,'" Honecker continued, "but this is sheer wishful thinking The concept of 'intra-German' is nothing but a new variant of West German revanchism toward the GDR."

ACCOUNTS OF BRANDT SPEECH ON BAHR-KOHL DISCUSSIONS

GDR and Soviet media carried dissimilar accounts of a speech made by Chancellor Brandt on the 19th to foreign mission chiefs in Bonn in which he discussed his government's relations with East Berlin. The GDR Foreign Ministry statement was issued on the same day. On the 20th, labeling the Brandt speech proof of Bonn's desire for "tutelage" over the GDR, an ADN dispatch in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND said Brandt had again asked third countries to heed Bonn's wishes regarding their relations with the GDR and that he demanded that they not develop their relations with the GDR "as long as there have not been certain settlements between the FRG and the GDR in accordance with his government's views." By contrast, TASS on the 19th merely said Brandt "wanted 'businesslike settlements' between the two German states." A report of the speech in PRAVDA the following day made no reference at all to Brandt's remarks on the Bahr-Kohl meetings.

East German and Soviet media also differed in their coverage of the ninth Bahr-Kohl meeting. While ADN and NEUES DEUTSCHLAND carried their regular terse statements that the two envoys met and agreed to continue the talks on 31 March, IZVESTIYA departed from its practice of similar terse reporting to publish on the 19th a Tosunyan dispatch from Bonn citing the West German delegate's remarks after the meeting to the press that the talk was "useful and that certain progress had been achieved."

ISSUE OF TREATIES WITH WEST GERMANY

Where the ADN account of Brandt's 19 October speech ignored the Chancellor's remarks on the Moscow and Warsaw treaties with Bonn, the TASS account gave them considerable space. Thus TASS quoted Brandt to the effect that as a result of his policy of improving relations with the socialist countries in areas of "mutual interest," a "certain amount of

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hostility and distrust" has already been dispelled. Then, with reference to the ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties, TASS quoted Brandt as saying that the treaties are "not tied to any formal preliminary conditions" but will not be submitted for ratification until the "desirable relaxation of tension manifests itself also at that point of central Europe which only in recent weeks was repeatedly the site of dangerous developments--I mean Berlin." TASS pointed out that Brandt said "nothing about the causes of the tense situation in West Berlin, which, as is known, springs from the activities of certain West German circles who deliberately create tension and friction in that area."

GDR PROTESTS FRG ACTIVITIES IN WEST BERLIN REICHSTAG BUILDING

East German media reacted heatedly to Federal Government activities in the Reichstag building in West Berlin on 21 March marking the centenary of the opening of the German Reichstag, as well as to announced plans for a meeting of the Bundestag Committee for Inner-German relations in the Reichstag building on 22 March. The GDR publicized a foreign ministry spokesman's protest on the 19th and a statement released the same day by the press office of the chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers.*

The foreign ministry spokesman's statement "sharply protested" these "illegal activities," stressing routinely that such acts "violate the status of the independent political entity of West Berlin," which "has never nor will ever" belong to the FRG. To avoid "new tensions and in the interests of the current negotiations on West Berlin," the spokesman declared, "it is necessary to discontinue any actions of the FRG in this city which are directed against the GDR and other socialist states. Such presumptions by the FRG vis-a-vis West Berlin are bound to cause complications and make more difficult the efforts to normalize the situation in West Berlin."

* The foreign ministry spokesman's statement protesting the actions in the Reichstag building, the statement from the press office of the chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers, and the foreign ministry spokesman's statement charging Bonn with distorting the Bahr-Kohl meetings all appeared in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND of 20 March on page one, displayed in the upper half of the page, and with big headlines. Normal procedure in recent months has been to publish such items at the bottom of page one or on an inside page with small headlines.

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Taking note of the foreign ministry spokesman's "emphatic protest," the statement by the press office of the chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers pointed out that participants in the "illegal activities" in the Reichstag building were "forbidden to travel through the GDR and enter its capital," according to orders issued by the GDR minister of the interior in 1968 and 1969.

MOSCOW COVERAGE Soviet media reported in detail both the foreign ministry spokesman's protest and the statement from the press office of the chairman of the Council of Ministers. PRAVDA, but not IZVESTIYA or RED STAR, included the passage in the foreign ministry spokesman's statement demanding that Bonn put an end to its actions in West Berlin "in the interests of avoiding tensions and in the interests of the current negotiations on West Berlin." A dispatch in PRAVDA by the paper's West Berlin correspondent Khodakovskiy commented that such FRG actions "can only hamper the efforts for the normalization of the situation in West Berlin."

A strongly worded criticism of Bonn's actions in West Berlin was made on the 22d by TASS commentator Yuriy Kornilov, who referred to alleged plans for a meeting of the Presidium of the FRG Bundestag in West Berlin on 22 March. Moscow had officially protested such alleged plans in an earlier oral statement to Western representatives, unreported in Soviet media. Commenting that Bonn's "ostensibly political functions" have "particularly increased of late," Kornilov charged that the holding of these functions in West Berlin "is nothing but an open demonstration of the FRG's claims to West Berlin, claims which are absolutely unfounded and which contravene international law." Suggesting that Bonn's actions will have wider implications, Kornilov continued: "One hardly needs to say that FRG activities of this kind may cause nothing but unnecessary friction and worsen the political climate, and not only in West Berlin itself but in Europe as a whole."

Linking Bonn's actions with the four-power talks, Kornilov declared that such actions are "especially out of place in conditions when talks are being conducted to improve the atmosphere in West Berlin and around it." They also, he said, "create additional difficulties in the way of achieving mutual understanding at the talks of the four powers regarding West Berlin." Kornilov placed the responsibility for "all possible consequences" of the "provocative venture" on those circles who want to complicate the talks on West Berlin and oppose detente-- language similar to that of the unpublicized Soviet oral protest.

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P R C - R O M A N I A

PEKING, BUCHAREST PUBLICIZE NEW ACCORDS ON EVE OF CPSU CONGRESS

Chinese efforts to gain leverage in Eastern Europe and to play up cordial ties with Moscow's Bucharest ally were reflected on the eve of the 24th CPSU Congress in publicity for the second Peking visit in less than five months of a Romanian delegation led by Deputy Premier Radulescu. As at the time of Radulescu's prior visit in November, Chou En-lai figured prominently in the high-level welcome Peking accorded the Romanians. And the visit this time produced an announcement that Chinese technical personnel are to be sent to Romania.

The announced purpose of the latest visit, which began on 20 March, was to work out details of the agreement Radulescu had signed in Peking in November, granting Romania a long-term, interest-free credit for the purchase of "equipment and complete installations." NCNA reported on the 22d that three new protocols were signed: "The first calls for "supplying Romania whole plants and technical aid," and the other two concern "the conditions of delivering complete sets of equipment and material supplied by China for Romania" and the "treatment and work conditions for the Chinese engineering and technical personnel to be sent to Romania."

This is the first monitored reference in Peking or Bucharest media to plans for the dispatch of Chinese technical personnel to Romania. As in the past, the NCNA account did not specify the types of equipment to be delivered, and a Bucharest AGERPRES report was equally vague in noting that the new agreements call for "complete installations and technical assistance." That military equipment may be involved is suggested by fact that the ranking Chinese officer after Deputy Premier Li Hsien-nien in the talks was Politburo member Chiu Hui-tso, PLA deputy chief of staff in charge of logistics, who accompanied Chou En-lai on his recent visit to Hanoi.

For the Romanians, the publicity for the agreements served to offset the notion--against the background of Western press speculation about Romania moving more closely into the Soviet orbit--that Bucharest's January decision to join the CEMA investment bank had compromised its independent stance. And the visit as a whole served to dramatize that stance at a politically opportune time. According to AGERPRES on the 23d,

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Radulescu's talks with Chou and other aspects of the trip were "amply featured by the entire Romanian press." Radulescu called attention to Chou's prominent role in events connected with the visit (at the signing ceremony and at a Romanian Embassy reception as well as in a special audience with Radulescu) by noting at the reception that he was "particularly honored" by Chou's presence.

For the Chinese, the visit afforded an opportunity to again publicize discussions with a Romanian official holding a high party as well as government post. Radulescu is a member of the prestigious party Executive Committee and of the RCP's Permanent Presidium. His remarks at a banquet given by Li Hsien-nien on the 20th and at the embassy reception on the 22d were notable for their emphasis--greater than in November--on excellent relations between the two countries on the party as well as state level. After hailing the "particularly positive" results of the negotiations, according to NCNA, Radulescu expressed the Romanian party and government's "high valuation, esteem, and friendship for the great Chinese people, for its glorious communist party and the government of the PRC." He went on to pay tribute to Peking's world role in noting that "the RCP" and the Romanian Government "attach great importance to the legitimate role incumbent on the PRC in the contemporary world in the fight against imperialism, in defense of the people's peace, liberty, and independence."

In his banquet speech Radulescu gave broad support to Peking's Asian policy, condemning U.S. policy in Indochina, calling for "withdrawal of foreign troops" from South Korea so that Korea can be unified, and supporting efforts to oust the "Chiang Kai-shek clique" from the United Nations. As if to underline Romanian support for Peking's Asian policy, NCNA reported on the 22d that Radulescu met with Sihanouk and had a "cordial and friendly conversation."

In his reply at the embassy reception, Li Hsien-nien took a few indirect swipes at Moscow in noting that Romanian-Chinese relations "strictly adhere to the principle of complete equality, maintaining independence and keeping the initiative in one's hands, and mutual respect." He went on to congratulate the Romanians on victories in their struggle for "the defense of national independence and state sovereignty and foreign interference and control." Li had played similar themes during Radulescu's visit in November, but he was more pointed at that time in specifically denouncing the "limited sovereignty" doctrine.

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PRC SATELLITE

CHINESE MEDIA PUBLICIZE CELEBRATIONS, FAVORABLE REACTIONS

In the pattern of its propaganda on the first Chinese satellite, orbited last April, Peking has not devoted any central press comment to the launching of a second vehicle on 3 March--announced in PRC media belatedly on the 16th. But Peking and Chinese regional radios have publicized nationwide celebrations of the feat, with NCNA noting on the 18th that "army-men and people in the hundreds of millions" have been inspired by the news. Indicating that the launch is being publicized, like the last one, as a means of rallying and spurring the populace, NCNA said that participants in meetings at factories, communes, government departments, schools, and barracks had hailed the feat as another victory for Mao's line and pledged themselves to greater efforts.

As it did a year ago, Peking has also given prominent play to friendly reactions from abroad, publicizing messages of congratulations as well as favorable foreign press and radio comment. It is through these proxies that Peking touched on the strategic implications of the launch: The Albanian leaders' message, for example, carried by NCNA on 18 March, said the feat serves to "further strengthen the defensive potential" of the PRC; and a message from Prince Souphanouvong, transmitted by NCNA on the 20th, said the launch was indicative of the development of China's national defense and had dealt "a telling blow to U.S. imperialist nuclear blackmail and nuclear threats."

USSR SILENT; ROMANIANS, ASIAN COMMUNISTS HAIL LAUNCHING

Moscow, which normally reports Chinese space events and nuclear tests in brief pickups of the NCNA announcements, has not been heard to mention this one. East Germany has also failed to report the event, but Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria have all acknowledged it in brief news dispatches citing NCNA.

Where Romania sent a congratulatory message signed by Premier Maurer after the April 1970 launch, it sent a joint message this time signed by Ceausescu as well as Maurer, wishing the

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PRC fresh successes in the work of socialist construction, of developing science and technology, and of exploring outer space "in the interests of strengthening the forces of socialism and of the cause of progress and peace in the world." AGERPRES carried the message, which NCNA also publicized. Romanian Council of Ministers Vice Chairman Gheorghe Radulescu, on a visit to Peking, took the occasion of a banquet speech on the 20th--carried in full by NCNA--to mention the launching as a demonstration of the PRC's scientific progress.

No congratulatory message from the Yugoslavs has been publicized in Peking or Belgrade media, although a Yugoslav message was publicized last April. Belgrade's POLITIKA did, however, take brief notice of the launch prior to NCNA's belated announcement of it.

Tirana's typically effusive propaganda response included, in addition to the leadership's congratulations, editorial articles in both ZERI I POPULLIT and BASHKIMI on the 17th, summarized by ATA. ZERI I POPULLIT said that the PRC possesses "everything needed to defend the victories of revolution and socialism, to curb and annihilate any aggressor or coalition of aggressors that would dare to touch her."

HANOI, THE PRG Customary messages of congratulations have
AND PYONGYANG come from the North Korean leadership and
 from the DRV and the South Vietnamese communists,
all reported by Peking. The NFLSV-PRG message, transmitted on the 20th by LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY, follows the standard pattern in calling the launch an "encouragement" for the South Vietnamese people and armed forces fighting the U.S. "aggressors."

Unlike its April 1970 counterpart, the DRV congratulatory message this time does not use the encouragement-of-the-Vietnamese line, rather declaring that the Vietnamese are rejoicing over the PRC's "valuable contribution to science and technology in the service of progressive mankind." A Hanoi domestic service commentary on the 17th said China's space successes increase the PRC's defense capabilities, strengthen the socialist camp, contribute to peace in Asia and the world, "and are a great encouragement for peoples struggling for liberation."

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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

NEW PEKING PARTY COMMITTEE HEADED BY HSIEH FU-CHIH

Comrade Hsieh Fu-chih is similar to me: he may have shortcomings, errors, and even rather serious errors, but he is a very correct comrade. - - From a speech by Chiang Ching, 24 March 1968*

On 19 March, exactly one year since his last public appearance, it was announced by NCNA that Hsieh Fu-chih had been elected first secretary of the new Peking Municipal CCP Committee at a congress convened from 10 to 15 March. Hsieh was not reported to have addressed the delegates, and indeed NCNA did not even indicate that he actually attended the congress.

Wu Te, subsequently elected second secretary of the Peking committee, delivered the opening report on behalf of the party nucleus group. At all previous provincial-level congresses of the current series, the top leader has fulfilled this function. In another departure from the norm, NCNA did not quote Wu Te's speech in its report on the congress; instead, it vaguely quoted "the delegates" and "the congress" throughout.

The content of the NCNA report differs little from previous examples except for placing its extensive praise for Mao in the local Peking context. As in all prior cases, the Peking committee is said to be a combination of "old, middle-aged, and young people." The form of the NCNA announcement does vary slightly inasmuch as the unusual leadership situation is highlighted by placing the names of the party leaders toward the beginning of the announcement rather than at the end as has been customary.

Peking has witnessed many leadership changes since the spring of 1966 when the city's leaders became the first to be purged by the cultural revolution. Li Hsueh-feng replaced Peng Chen but by the end of 1966 was found wanting. Wu Te, transferred with Li from his former post as first secretary in Kirin,

* From a collection of leader speeches published in Yunnan: JPRS "Translations on Communist China," No. 140, 18 March 1971.

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seemed to assume acting control of the committee until the appointment of Hsieh as revolutionary committee chairman in April 1967. Wu survived criticism to become Hsieh's deputy and has held second rank in the city since that time. During the past year he has filled in for Hsieh at official functions.

Hsieh Fu-chih was Minister of Public Security and a vice premier before the cultural revolution. After taking over the Peking leadership, he seemed to assume a Chou-type role of moderator over cultural revolution disputes; in this function he was involved in the Wuhan incident during the summer of 1967. In 1969 he was elected to the Politburo and seemed to be among the most important of the active leaders of the PRC until his disappearance last March. Hsieh was never criticized in the media, and it has been assumed that he is undergoing labor rectification for an ideological error "within the ranks of the people." His apparent continued absence indicates that, whatever his task for the past year, it is not yet completed; but if reform was necessary his progress seems to have been good.

Hsieh's case is far from unique in the history of the PRC. Even Peng Te-huai was allowed to retain his Politburo rank until the beginning of the cultural revolution, when his rehabilitation was obviously judged unsuccessful. And Hsieh's predecessor, Li Hsueh-feng, came back from his Peking failure to head the Hopei Provincial Revolutionary Committee a year later. It is still far from certain, however, that a top leader who has been forced to undergo reform can really regain his former power even should his formal position be unchanged.

The new Peking committee is composed of 86 members and alternates, with 15 members elected to the standing committee. Of the five secretaries elected to serve under Hsieh and Wu, four are from the often purged Peking garrison--Yang Chun-sheng, Wu Chung, Huang Tso-chen, and Liu Shao-wen. The other secretary, Ting Kuo-yu, is another former secretary of the old party committee. None of Peking's once notorious student leaders and none of the leaders of its worker congress was made a secretary; some of these may, of course, serve on the standing committee. Unless Hsieh should return with a firm mandate, the PLA seems to hold the dominant role in Peking affairs.

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CPSU - JCP RELATIONS

JCP AND CPSU MOVE TO IMPROVE FORMAL PARTY RELATIONS

After concluding 5 days of official talks with a CPSU delegation in Moscow on 19 March, the Japan Communist Party (JCP) announced on 22 March that it will send a delegation to the 24th CPSU Congress opening on 30 March in Moscow. The JCP refused to attend the 23d CPSU Congress in 1966 as well as the World Communist Conference in Moscow in 1969; it was represented at the 22d CPSU Congress, in 1961.

The joint communique, published on 21 March in AKAHATA and PRAVDA, reported the results of the week-long talks between the delegations headed by CPSU Politburo member Suslov and JCP Presidium member Tomio Nishizawa. The meeting was said to have been held in "an atmosphere of comradeship and frankness," phraseology traditionally used to indicate that less than full agreement has been reached.

The specific issues separating the two parties were soft-pedaled in the communique, which expressed in general terms the mutual readiness to solve outstanding problems between the CPSU and JCP on the "principles of independence, equality, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs." The 1968 joint JCP-CPSU communique was cited as a "good basis for normalizing relations between the CPSU and the JCP." Going beyond the wording of the communique signed 3 years ago, however, both delegations "agreed upon concrete steps to remove obstacles in the way of normalizing relations." Future consultations are to be held when necessary, the communique stated. Thorny issues such as the differences over the Soviet Union's intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and alleged CPSU support for a pro-Soviet splinter group led by one-time JCP member Yoshio Shiga, which once drew heated exchanges, were not mentioned.

BACKGROUND Relations between the JCP and Moscow deteriorated in 1964 when the JCP sharply criticized the CPSU for signing the nuclear test ban treaty. Problems between the two parties intensified as the JCP charged Moscow with supporting former JCP member Yoshio Shiga and other pro-Soviet dissidents in their efforts to form a splinter party. Talks in Tokyo during February 1968 between Suslov and Kenji Miyamoto, secretary general of the JCP, resulted in a joint communique

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which indicated that the two delegations had agreed to modulate their quarrels.

Relations then appeared to be improving until the Czech intervention triggered loud JCP denunciations. A scathing attack on the JCP appeared in the CPSU's PARTY LIFE just before the opening of the JCP's 11th party congress in July 1970--to which the CPSU was not asked to send a delegation. AKAHATA on 5 August 1970 lashed out at PARTY LIFE's "distorted" portrayal of the JCP's "standpoint of self-reliance and independence" and condemned the "big-power chauvinism" which motivated Soviet party leaders in their attempt "to get control of the entire international communist movement."

JAPANESE REACTION AKAHATA on 22 March reported that Nishizawa had returned to Japan on the 20th and released the communique at a press conference. On 22 March KYODO reported that the delegation to the Soviet congress will be led by Nishizawa himself and Ichiro Sunama, a member of the Presidium, also present at the Moscow talks. A JAPAN TIMES article on 21 March speculated that the CPSU had agreed to suspend "support for a JCP splinter group led by Yoshio Shiga in order to normalize joint relations." The article concluded that the two parties "remained at odds on such issues as the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia."

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

NEW UKRAINIAN LEADERSHIP REFLECTS PRECARIOUS BALANCE

The new Politburo and Secretariat elected at the close of the Ukrainian party congress on 20 March reflects the political infighting between factions led by First Secretary Shelest and his rivals, Premier Shcherbitskiy and President Lyashko. Shelest's faction appears to have held its ground, though barely so, as did the Dnepropetrovsk faction of Brezhnev's protege Shcherbitskiy. Lyashko's Donetsk faction, which appeared to have been in decline, seems now to have gained somewhat, with the election of Donetsk First Secretary Degtyarev to full Politburo membership. His election increases the Politburo to ten men instead of the normal nine--thereby increasing the possibility of deadlocks.

The pecking order within the new Politburo was revealed in a 21 March Kiev radio broadcast. Instead of listing the members alphabetically, as the 1966 post-congress radio report had done, it listed them by rank:

21 March 1971 radio ranking	1969-1970 usual ranking of old Politburo
1. Shelest (first secretary)	1. Shelest
2. Shcherbitskiy (premier)	2. Shcherbitskiy
3. Lyashko (president)	3. Lyashko
4. Lutak (second secretary)	4. Lutak
5. Titarenko (heavy industry secretary)	5. Kalchenko
6. Kalchenko (first deputy premier)	6. Drozdenko
7. Sobol (first deputy premier)	7. Titarenko
8. Vatchenko (Dnepropetrovsk secretary)	8. Sobol
9. Vashchenko (Kharkov secretary)	9. Vatchenko
10. Degtyarev (Donetsk secretary)	

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candidate members:

Borisenko (agriculture secretary)	Borisenko
Ovcharenko (ideology secretary)	Ovcharenko
Pogrebnyak (light industry secretary)	Vashchenko
Sologub (apparently to become trade union chief)	Klimenko (trade union chief)
Grushetskiy (party commission chairman)	Grushetskiy
	Degtyarev

LYASHKO GAINS Although Lyashko's faction has been under attack by Shelest since 1969 and has seen several of its members demoted, three Lyashko proteges were promoted at the conclusion of the congress: The Donetsk first secretary, V. I. Degtyarev, from Politburo candidate member to full member; the Donetsk second secretary, V. A. Sologub, to Politburo candidate member; and the Nikolayev first secretary, Ya. P. Pogrebnyak (Donetsk second secretary under obkom first secretary Lyashko in 1962), to Politburo candidate member and Central Committee secretary for light industry. The new hierarchical listing also upgraded the status of secretary Titarenko--formerly Lyashko's assistant in Donetsk--even though he had conceded shortcomings in his heavy industry field at an October 1970 Ukrainian plenum on construction. There are now three full Politburo members from Donetsk (Lyashko, Titarenko, Degtyarev), two candidate members (Pogrebnyak, Sologub), and two secretaries (Pogrebnyak, Titarenko).

Shelest apparently managed to block the promotion of Lyashko's close henchman V. M. Tsybulko, who as Kiev first secretary might have rated at least Politburo candidate membership. Shelest had harshly attacked the Kiev leadership just before the congress (RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 20 February--see FBIS TRENDS for 3 March, pp. 35-36). Kiev, the second largest oblast organization, is unrepresented in the Politburo, while the first secretaries of the other three largest oblasts are full members.

Although the Dnepropetrovsk faction, led by premier Shcherbitskiy, had advanced its representatives to key posts in recent months (A. Ulanov to Central Committee cadres chief and P. L. Pogrebnyak to agriculture minister) over Shelest's apparent opposition, these gains were not reflected in the new leadership. The Dnepropetrovsk faction remains represented only by Shcherbitskiy and Vatchenko in the Politburo.

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Shelest appears to have held his ground, with a plus in the elevation of Kharkov first secretary Vashchenko to full Politburo member and a minus in the removal of Drozdenko, who had served under Shelest in Kiev. Shelest had praised the work of Vashchenko's Kharkov organization in his speech to the February 1971 Kharkov party conference (RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 7 February), and the Kharkovites were proteges of Shelest's erstwhile patron Podgornyy. Kharkov is also represented in the Politburo by First Deputy Premier Sobol, Vashchenko's erstwhile patron.

Although Drozdenko had benefited from a diverse array of patrons, his more recent career suggested good relations with Shelest. He began his early career in Dnepropetrovsk under Shcherbitskiy and Kirilenko, eventually becoming oblast Komsomol first secretary (1951-1952) under oblast party first secretary Kirilenko. He rose to Ukrainian Komsomol first secretary (1955-1960) during Shelepin's tenure as All-Union Komsomol first secretary. He was named Kiev city first secretary in 1960 by Podgornyy, Ukrainian first secretary, and worked with Shelest, then Kiev oblast first secretary, for 2 years, succeeding him in that post when Shelest moved up to Ukrainian Central Committee secretary in August 1962. He followed Shelest to the Ukrainian Secretariat at the 1966 congress and eventually became third ranking secretary with responsibility for light industry, food industry and trade.

Drozdenko's decline can be traced to mid-1970, when he was not reelected to the USSR Supreme Soviet and two of his subordinates were removed. The head of the central Committee's trade and finance organs section, V. G. Starunskiy, was transferred to trade minister in August, and the head of the Central Committee's light industry and food industry section, Yu. F. Gayevskiy, was transferred to local industry minister in October. On the eve of the Ukrainian congress Drozdenko's appointment as ambassador to Rumania was announced (PRAVDA, 16 March).

DISSENSION OVER HONCHAR The issue of Oles Honchar's novel "Sobor" (The Cathedral), which has long divided the Ukrainian Politburo, was raised again at the congress by Vatchenko, Dnepropetrovsk first secretary. In 1968 Vatchenko had launched a vicious attack on the novel, but the ensuing Dnepropetrovsk campaign was ignored by republic leaders, and Honchar survived the attempt to replace him as head of the Ukrainian Writers Union. Although the struggle in

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the writers union eventually quieted down, Dnepropetrovsk has continued to persecute Honchar's defenders. For instance, in February 1970 a Dnepropetrovsk court sentenced three youths to prison for sending a letter abroad (published in the February 1969 emigree journal SUCHASNIST) exposing Vatchenko's campaign against Honchar's novel; the trial was reported in the Dnepropetrovsk newspaper ZORYA on 7 February 1970.

Shelest's congress report was vague and indirect on literary shortcomings, but it included a remark which could have been aimed at Honchar. He complained about the writing of "politically immature" works "not only by certain young and inexperienced" writers "but even by certain well-known artists" (RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 18 March.) Vatchenko, however, pressed the issue. Speaking immediately after Shelest, he criticized the Ukraine's ideological leaders (i.e., ideology secretary Ovcharenko) for not cracking down on ideologically weak works and implicitly called for Honchar's removal. "The comrades who direct ideological questions in the Ukrainian Central Committee," he declared, "should obviously analyze more deeply, in a more principled way, and more critically the state of ideological-educational work in creative organizations, significantly improve the choice of leading cadres for them, and strengthen party control of their activities" (RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 18 March).

Vashchenko, first secretary of Kharkov, where copies of "Sobor" were reportedly burned in the streets (SUCHASNIST, August 1968), joined Vatchenko's attack. He urged that "the ideological sections of the Ukrainian Central Committee should be more principled and demanding" in evaluating "the activities of creative unions and certain of their representatives" and should "close the road to all artistically poor works, no matter who wrote them" (RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 18 March).

Nevertheless, despite these attacks and earlier signs of disfavor, Ovcharenko was reelected ideology secretary. His position had appeared precarious in mid-1970. Like Drozdenko and Klimenko (who were dropped from the Politburo at the congress) and Doroshenko (dropped as agriculture minister in February 1971), he was not reelected to the USSR Supreme Soviet in June. And his assistant, agitprop chief G. G. Shevel, was removed and transferred to the innocuous post of Ukrainian foreign minister in August.

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